Abstract-This paper is a reply to Laviolette and Seaman's critical discussion of fuzzy set theory. Rather than questioning the interest of the Bayesian approach to uncertainty, some reasons why Bayesian find the idea of a fuzzy set not palatable are laid bare. Some links between fuzzy sets and probability that Laviolette and Seaman seem not to be aware of are pointed out. These links suggest that, contrary to the claim sometimes found in the literature, probability theory is not a special case of fuzzy set theory. The major objection to Laviolette and Seaman is that they found their critique on as very limited view of fuzzy sets, including debatable papers, while they fail to account for significant works pertaining to axiomatic derivation of fuzzy set connectives, possibility theory, fuzzy random variables, among others.
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I. INTRODUCTION HE paper proposed by Laviolette and Seaman contains a
T good exposition of the major difficulties encountered by subjective Bayesians reading fuzzy set papers. Perhaps the reason for the strong antagonism between subjective Bayesianism and fuzzy set theory is the fact that each school has claimed to capture uncertainty by means of their mathematical models. In such a context, it is not easy to make room for two. In such a debate, however, the positions held by fuzzy set theory turn out to be more heterogeneous and soft than the ones of subjective probability for historical and cultural reasons. The concerns behind early papers on fuzzy sets are away from the concerns of the founders of subjective Bayesianism. The former wished to describe summarized, simple models of complex physical systems as perceived and verbally described by humans; and they have evolved toward a general paradigm of approximate reasoning: how to mechanize various forms of reasoning tasks (such as interpolative reasoning, deduction under incomplete information, computation with fuzzy numbers, etc.) on the basis of vague pieces of knowledge modeled by means of flexible constraints? Fuzzy sets have never been deeply concerned with the central issue underlying subjective probability: how to make rational decisions under uncertainty. Major fuzzy set papers dealing with decision-making ([4], [8], [12] , for instance) aim to discuss the existence of a difference between the concept of a constraint and the concept of a goal and its implication in mathematical programming. Other decisionoriented fuzzy set papers deal with sensitivity analysis in utility-based approaches, or with various extensions of the choice problem with relational preference models (the Russian On the other hand, it is also clear that some fuzzy set advocates are not sufficiently aware of subjective probability.' In this paper, we shall describe our own positions on the fuzzy set versus probability debate. Then we shall refute what we think are misfounded claims against fuzzy set theory.
FOUR BASIC STATEMENTS ON

FUZZY SETS AND UNCERTAINTY
Our views of the links betwen fuzzy sets and probability have been presented recently elsewhere (Dubois and h a d e [lo]), and are briefly summarized here:
A . The problem of Quantifying Partial Belief is Different from the One of Modeling Vagueness
Partial belief is basically due to incomplete information. If you do not have a complete and precise description of the state of the world, you cannot reply with certainty to all queries pertaining to this world. In that sense, uncertainty refers to partial belief only, in our terminology. Fuzzy sets, in their preliminary version, have little to offer for the modeling of partial belief. It is only since the emergence of possibility However, Prade's quotation emphasizing the frequentist view of probabilities, and reproduced by Laviolette and Seaman, is taken from the footnote of an unpublished paper which offers a mathematical classification of set-functions aiming at modeling uncertainty but which does not discuss subjective versus objective uncertainty. Taken out of this context, the quotation may have a meaning which is stronger than the one intended by its author, even in 1979.
1063-6706/94$04.00 0 1994 IEEE theory in 1978 that fuzzy sets can be clearly related to this problem (see Subsection C).
Modeling vagueness is a problem of representing what is sometimes called lexical imprecision of linguistic terms. It tries to capture the fact that some predicates underlie some graduality, or some notion of intensity in their relevance to qualify a given situation. This feature is sometimes due to the presence of a continuous scale underlying linguistic terms. For instance, it is strange to represent the term "old" by means of a precise interval of the real line: any threshold is arbitrary and cannot account with the fact that people gradually become "old." This imprecision is also due to the idea of typicality: the predicate "bird" does not have a uniform extension because some animals are more bird-like than others. In that context, membership functions are only preference relations induced by linguistic habits.
B. Membership Functions Can Have Probabilistic Interpretations, But This is Not Compulsory
One should not confuse a membership function and a probability density. For instance, the (crisp) characteristic function of an interval is not a probability density. But it makes sense to use probability theory and its operational settings in order to derive membership functions. Along these lines, a membership grade p~ ( u ) can in some contexts be estimated as a degree of likelihood P('F'Ju) where 'F' is a nonfuzzy event consisting of attaching to object U the name F . In other contexts, p~( u ) will be the one-point coverage function of a random set. Then F is a random set and p~ ( u ) is the proportion of (set-valued) realizations of F that contain U. For a discussion and a bibliography on these issues, see [9] and [lo] .
But membership functions need not be related to probability. p~ ( u ) can be the degree of proximity between U and an ideal prototype of F , i.e., based on the idea of distance rather than probability. Especially, the distance view does not presuppose the existence of a precise boundary between F and non-F as the above probabilistic views seem to do.
Consequently, we certainly do not accept the idea, sometimes found in fuzzy set papers, that fuzzy sets generalize probability. They can be related to probability in the random set or likelihood function views; or they can be viewed as standing fully apart from probability theory. On this point, Laviolette and Seaman are right to question the "superset hypothesis." Our opinion in this debate has been explained in [lo] . We rather subscribe to a "disjoint set assumption with multiple optional bridges." Vagueness can be operationally interpreted in terms of probabilities, especially if we consider the embedding of fuzzy sets in random sets; but it need not be so. Especially, the "0.8 membership value of George Bush in the set of tall men" may be variously interpreted: "80% of a given population declared that George Bush is tall" (likelihood view), "80% of a given population described "tall" as an interval containing George Bush's height" (random set view), George Bush's height is at a (normalized) distance equal to 0.2 from the closest ideal prototypical size representing "tall."
More generally, a membership function can be viewed as encoding a preference relation > F on a referential set, such that U 1~ U' means that U is at least as good a prototype of F as U'. A membership function is something more than a preference relation since there is no way to combine two complete orderings pertaining to two distinct fuzzy sets F and G. Indeed, fuzzy set theory underlies a commensurability assumption that enable the extents to which U belongs to F and G to be compared. In fuzzy set theory, it makes sense to say that "John is as tall as he is old," or more precisely that "John is as close from the considered idea of tallness as from the one of being old." This assumption, which is perhaps debatable, is very useful to apply fuzzy set theory in practice. It only requires that some complete lattice L be used as a set of membership grades. Had this lattice L be chosen as different from unit interval, it is not clear that confusion between fuzzy sets and probability and the related controversies would have existed. Yet it is true that very few works on measurement theoretic foundations of fuzzy set are available, and this state of facts hampers the sound development of fuzzy sets (but see ~5 1 .
C. It is Not Self-Evident that Any State of Partal Belief Should be Represented by Means of a Single Probability Distribution
In his paper [28] , Zadeh claimed that the membership function p~ of a fuzzy set could serve as a possibility distribution T . The fuzzy set then describes the set of more or less possible values a variable x can take, these values being mutually exclusive. The possibility that 2, whose possible values are described by T = p~, lies in a given set A is n(A) = sup{x(x), z E A } and its certainty is dually defined by N(A) = 1 -II(?r) where 3 is the complement of A [8],
[ 11 1. These two set-functions can be compared to a probability function, as suggested by Zadeh himself, saying that an event should be probable prior to being possible. It leads to the following consistency condition (e.g., [SI):
VA. N ( A ) 5 P ( A ) 5 II(A).
This postulate puts possibility and necessity measures inside the large family of set-functions representing partial belief, and that can be modeled as probability bounds. It includes Choquet's [6] capacities and Shafer's [21] belief functions, for instance. It is in that sense that, to quote Laviolette and Seaman," possibilities can be interpreted probabilistically." But accepting that partial belief can be modeled by means of a set of probability measures instead of a single one is already a very daring step to take for a subjective Bayesian (but see [26] ). Anyway, it overcomes the question of representing ignorance that cannot be solved by means of a single probability distribution (e.g., the problem of prior probability in the Bayesian theory): letting ignorance be defined as an identically indifferent state of belief regarding any event A different from the ever false one (0) or the ever true one (a), there is no probability measure P on a set R with cardinality greater than 2 such that
P ( A ) = P ( B ) .
But possibility measures (and more generally upper bounds of probability) make it possible to represent this state of indifference usually called ignorance (i.e., VA,B # 0 , I I ( A ) =
II(B) = 1).
Note that this type of ignorance is not what subjective Bayesians are usually interested in modeling. They are rather interested in modeling ignorance about "what to do" or "what will happen next," instead of the idea of incomplete information. For instance, a uniform distribution over the facets of die is a natural model of our incapacity to predict the outcome of the next throw, or to select the corresponding facet. But it says nothing about the origin of this incapacity, and does not tell the case of a die that is known to be unbiased from the case of an unknown die.
It seems appropriate to take advantage of Laviolette and Seaman's statement that "the inclusion of one theory as a special case of another does not in itself imply the subset theory is inferior in any practical sense." Possibility measures can be viewed as special cases of evidence theory, random set theory, upper and lower probability theory, and is akin to likelihood theory. It does not make its study as an uncertainty modeling tool worthless. Moreover, we believe that probability theory and possibility theory are two complementary basic views of uncertainty. There are situations where both have to be used conjointly (e.g., fusion of probabilistic information and fuzzy set information, computation with ill-known probabilities, etc.).
D. Uncertainty Can be Expressed by Ordinal Models that are Not Related to Probability
Again, nothing forces anybody to define possibility degrees in connection with a probabilistic interpretation. Partial belief can be more crudely defined as an ordering over a set of events, and there is no a priori reason to search for an additive representation for the ordering. Let us consider an ordering > N on a set of propositions which expresses relative certainty.
" A >N B" means " A is at least as certain as B" in the following sense; if we believe in A and B , and we happen to hear that C is true, where C contradicts { A , a}, then in order to restore consistency in our belief set, we would rather do away with B rather than A , whenever A >,v B. As in the case of comparative probability, the ordering is supposed to be transitive and complete, C2 > N 0, where > N expresses strict preference and R 2~ A > N 0,VA. The basic axiom for certainty is [7] This axiom is in accordance with the above semantics which in turn differ from probabilistic semantics. It can be proved that the only numerical counterparts to comparative certainty relations are necessity measures, N ( A ) = 1 -n(2) that emerge from the setting of fuzzy sets. The dual relation of comparative possibility is defined by A Ln B * L N 2 and obeys an axiom dual to (1) (changing intersection into union).
These types of uncertainty models are encountered in frameworks different from fuzzy sets, namely, in the theory of revision of propositional theories [ 131 where certainty relations are called "epistemic entrenchment relations," and in conditional logics [ 171 where comparative possibility seem to appear for the first time. Clearly, this setting is a poorer framework than probability for modeling uncertainty, where only ordering relations are used, which explains that possibility measures are characterized by the axiom II(A U B ) = max (II(A),n(B) ) and necessity measures by the axiom N ( A n B ) = min (N(A),N(B) ), and can take their values in any linearly ordered set. The merit of this setting is that it is capable of telling possibility from certainty since N < II generally, while probability theory cannot express this distinction [due to P ( 2 ) = 1 -P@)] except if we accept to represent uncertainty by probability bounds. Indeed, we can distinguish between the certainty that A is false (II(A) = 0) and the total lack of certainty that A is true ( N ( A ) = 0) : II(A) = 0 implies N ( A ) = 0, but the converse does not hold.
The existence of purely ordinal models of uncertainty as distinct from additive models should not be surprising nor shocking. Possibility theory is not really concerned with the result of subjective probability theory-stating that if uncertainty assessments are to be point-valued and consistent, then they would formally be probabilities. One reason is that uncertainty assessments in possibility theory are not point- 
REALISM, SUBJECTIVISM, BEHAVIORISM, AND THE LIKE
On the basis of the above statement of our point of view on fuzzy sets and possibility theory, we can now address some philosophical issues raised by Laviolette and Seaman. As it tums out, we agree on many points, except that we do not consider Bayesianism as the ultimate answer to the problems of uncertainty modeling. Finally, we briefly comment on the issue of comparing fuzzy and probabilistic methods.
A. Do Fuzzy Sets Exist?
Like Laviolette and Seaman, we do not share the view that phenomena are inherently vague. Among the early motivations for fuzzy set theory is the problem of classification [3]. The basic question is whether set theory is enough to account for the way people would like to classify objects. Classification itself is not objective. Our way of classifying objects may differ from our neighbors'. At best, it may be a matter of consensus. A classification is thus a property of the observer. Now, nothing forces this observer to specify his classes in a crisp way, and he may feel comfortable by expressing that a nectarine partially belongs to the class of plums and to the class of peaches. Hence, fuzzy sets are a simple way of representing graduality in classes, and depend upon the observer. But, indeed, it does not seem possible to have a universally accepted definition of a fuzzy predicate, e.g., "tall," even once the context (e.g., Swedish male adults) is made precise. Even if there is a common agreement that "the greater your size, the taller you are," given membership grades may vary from one observer to another. This remark points out the limited interest of tests like the one reported in [ 191 which asks people for degrees of membership. What is really important, in practice, and what fuzzy sets are good for, is to correctly represent the pieces of knowledge provided by a person, and to capture the meaning he intends to give to his own words.
We subscribe to fuzzy counterparts to Bayesian subjectivist statements and are ready to say that fuzzy sets do not exist, but vagueness (i.e., graduality) does exist (in our knowledge and language) and fuzzy sets can be used to model it. Again, the state of the art in measurement-theoretic foundations of fuzzy sets is still in infancy, unfortunately. We again insist on the difference between probability and graduality. To say that some one is probably old does not convey the same meaning as to say that someone is very old.
B . Approximate and Ideal Ellipses
If we stick to the dogma that all our (subjective) classifications should be crisp, then we shall work with almost empty classes. The probability that an imperfect ellipse (as hand-drawn on a piece of paper) is an ideal one is zero. But the degree of membership of an imperfect ellipse in the subjectively perceived class of ellipsoidal objects (i.e., its levels of compatibility with an individual view of ellipse) may be high. The degree of membership of the ideal ellipse is one.
At this point, it may be appropriate to comment on the necessity to make decisions when classifying. Namely, we distinguish the representation problem, i.e., assessing the proximity of a figure to an ideal ellipse, from the decision problem, i.e., deciding to act as if the figure were actually an ellipse.
The first problem involves no decision step and a fuzzy classification seems appropriate. There is no idea of probability involved. The second problem does involve a decision, and we might assess the probability that an individual will act as if the figure were an ellipse. This probability should not necessarily be equated to the degree of proximity of the figure to the ideal ellipse, even if it is reasonable to postulate that "the closer the figure to an ellipse, the higher the probability that an individual will act as if the figure were an ellipse," Denoting p~ ( u ) as the proximity of figure U to the ideal ellipse E (based on a well-defined distance) and P(E1u) as this probability, the function P(
is defined only up to a monotone transformation. Moreover, the maximumlikelihood principle applied to make a decision about the figure   will give the same result with P ( E ( u ) and p~ ( u ) if the link between proximity and probability is postulated. However, we can make two remarks, as follows.
This postulated link should not lead us to confuse the two problems-the representation problem and the decision problem. There is sometimes no use to deciding too early. For instance, interpolative reasoning at work in a fuzzy logic controller obviates the decision step for triggering the rules; the membership grades that reflect the classification of the current situation, with respect to the typical situations described by the rules, are directly used in the interpolation process. Another example is when we want to distinguish between situations where we have sufficient information about potential decisions to rank them linearly, and situations where poor information leads to too-vague estimates of the relative worth of these decisions.
C . Frequentist Fuzzy Sets
Laviolette and Seaman are right to point out that many people have misleadingly claimed that fuzzy sets are good at modeling subjective uncertainty, while probability is an objective measure of uncertainty. We agree that this view is misfounded, and is due to the cultural gap existing between fuzzy set advocates and Bayesian subjectivists. Probability is amenable to multiple interpretations including subjectivist ones. Although the idea of getting membership functions from frequency experiments does not seem to have pervaded the mythology of fuzzy sets, there exist many papers that consider this question (see the bibliography in [9]), and their very existence is a denial of the "subjectivity hypothesis." Some authors have defined operational procedures to measure membership functions as likelihood functions; others have embedded fuzzy set theory into random set theory. The existence of frequentist (pseudo-"objective") membership functions thus follows from the existence of frequentist probability. There exist several interpretations of probability calculus; likewise, possibility theory can be also interpreted in various ways; see the discussion in [23] .
However, another reason for the continuing existence of the subjectivity hypothesis may be understood by comparing possibility measures and probability measures in the setting of, e.g., random sets or belief functions. A probability measure is a dissonant random set (since outcomes of a standard random experiment are mutually exclusive), while a possibility measure is a consonant random set (outcomes form a family of nested sets). Now suppose that the random experiment consists of repeatedly asking a person a question such as "how old will the next U.S. president be on the day of his election?" One might find it more natural that the sequence of his answer form a nested family of imprecise statements (e.g., "he will be between 50 and 60") rather than a random sequence of very precise age guesses. In that sense, possibility theory appears like a more faithful (even if poorer) model of subjective incomplete knowledge than of probability theory.
D. The Behaviorist Versus Normative Debate
The issue raised by Laviolette and Seaman, called the "behaviorist hypothesis," is a problem that extends far beyond fuzzy set theory. It also pervades decision theory and cognitive sciences at large. The main question is: it is worthwhile to model human knowledge and emulate human behavior for problem solving and decision tasks? It is obvious that fuzzy set theoretists answer "yes" to that question. But they are not the only ones. People in Artificial Intelligence, neural networks, and some branches of decision theory also adopt behaviorist attitudes to some extent. For instance, there exist many developments of Savage's utility theory that use nonadditive probability as a representation of uncertainty (e.g., [20] and [27] ). Bayesian decision theory is optimal within a restricted setting where betting makes sense, potential decisions are all at hand, and potential consequences can be enumerated moreover, it is well adapted to repeated decisions. But what is optimality in a practical problem where knowledge is partially missing, goals are multiple and conflicting, and decisions take place on a limited time span? How do we interpret systematic violations of a normative decision or reasoning theory by individuals? Should they be overlooked as being irrelevant or do they invalidate the theory? The interest raised in the utility theory community by Allais or Ellsberg paradoxes show that people having previously adopted Savage axioms can accept to relax them. Fuzzy set theory may appear as "ultrabehaviorist" because of the apparent freedom to choose fuzzy set-theoretic connectives, implications, etc. This impression is all the stronger with the current popularity of fuzzy control and the similarity between neutral nets and systems of fuzzy rules. Clearly, neural nets tend to be an "ultrabehaviorist" approach because neural methods are very similar to the black-box approach of systems identification.
Yet, fuzzy sets can be cast inside an axiomatic framework, where mathematical properties of fuzzy set connectives can be related to assumptions about human reasoning behavior. There is a tradition of papers, starting with [2] and continuing with the "school" of triangular norms, that studies axiomatic justifications of fuzzy set combinations and enable implications to be classified, for instance. Laviolette and Seaman do not cite this tradition, while it looks very relevant to envisage fuzzy set theory from a normative point of view.
E . Fuzzy Versus Probabilistic Methods
Laviolette and Seaman found their comparative analysis of fuzzy and probabilistic models on the "superset assumption." The problem here is that this assumption is not rigorously defined in their paper. The authors' bibliography on this aspect seems to be very deficient. Especially, they do not mention the embedding of fuzzy sets within random set theory that is particularly illuminating on the specific roles played by fuzzy sets and probability measures.
Besides, it is not clear that it makes sense to deliver general statements regarding the compared worth of general approaches to problem solving tasks, on the basis of a few examples. The choice of a method by some individual depends upon his familiarity with a class of tools. On a given practical problem, it is always possible to show that a well-designed method of one's favorite kind outranks a less well-designed method of another kind. One may also say that the three examples chosen by Laviolette and Seaman are rather marginal with respect to the main trends in the fuzzy set literature (cf., e.g., [12] ). There is no way of discussing the quality control example or the regression analysis example if we are not specialists of these fields. In the case of fuzzy linear regression, the authors criticize an old preliminary paper. Since then, Tanaka's team has done a lot of work in this area, and many other researchers have published results as well. Laviolette and Seaman should consult [l] and [15] in order to get a flavor of the current works.
The critique of Piasecki's attempt to equip fuzzy relations with probabilistic semantics is very similar to the kind of argument Allais used in the early 1950's when refuting the criterion of expected utility for decision making. Allais claimed that the decision-maker choices are risk-dependent, and thus sensitive to the variance of utility, not only to the expected value. It is strange that an argument used against subjective Bayesianism is used by subjective Bayesians criticizing fuzzy methods. Moreover, by doing so, Laviolette and Seaman adopt the very behaviorist point of view they had rejected a few pages before.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Overall, fuzzy sets offer a mathematical paradigm in which several types of notions can be captured such as soft classification, flexible constraints, interpolative reasoning, and various forms of reasoning with incomplete and vague information. It also has some connections with various fields of investigation such as statistics (likelihood functions), game theory (the maxmin optimization problem), nonadditive probability, random sets, nonmonotonic reasoning, systems identification (e.g., [24] , on fuzzy modeling).
Obviously, the aim of fuzzy set theory is not to prove that statistics, game theory, and other established fields have been erroneously developed so far. Fuzzy set theory is a convenient fiction for modeling graduality in human cognitive processes. Laying bare its relationships with other existing fields of investigation is both a necessary and fruitful task; and far from resulting in establishing its uselessness, achieving this task is likely to strengthen its foundations.
Finally, we certainly do not believe that there exists a single theory that provides "a complete and uniquely optimal means for solving problems and managing uncertainty." Each concerned theory, whenever it is mathematically consistent (as is the case with probability theory, fuzzy set and possibility theory, and several others), is only a convenient and appropriate means for solving a particular type of problem and grasping a particular facet of uncertainty. To make the point a little bit more precise, subjective Bayesianism is a rigorous framework for decision under uncertainty; fuzzy set theory is a general algebraic framework for modeling lexical imprecision and graduality in predicates; possibility theory is a simple ordinal theory of set functions for modeling and reasoning with incomplete knowledge, that can be imbedded, if needed, in the setting of upper probabilities. Note that the two latter theories are focused on knowledge representation and various types of reasoning tasks (deductive, interpolative, abductive) but not decision. Unfortunately, this crucial remark is often overlooked by subjective Bayesians because of the stress on decision-making processes that pervades the Bayesian cultural background. As a consequence, subjective Bayesians seem to be convinced that all mental activities involve only decision
Steps, that only these steps deserve mathematical models, and that the boundaries of rational decision-making crisply coincide with the ones of expected utility theory. This may be the basic point of disagreement between Bayesians and other researchers in fuzzy set theory, artificial intelligence, and the like.
